


Deputy Director For Requirements and Evaluation  
Intelligence Community Staff  
Washington, D.C. 20505



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18 July 1988

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NOTE FOR:

ADD0(CI)

SUBJECT: Free Information re USSR

Attached is a copy of an article given to me by Mr. Douglass, one of the authors. Joe sent me this copy after he told me that no one seemed to be interested in the subject. That response came to my question: What's new and exciting? Joe did say that OGI had talked to him about this subject, but that contact apparently withered.

In any case, I am sending this copy to you because Joe made the point to me that the Soviets are using drugs as a means of influencing people. It appears to have some obvious counterintelligence ramifications, to whatever degree this is so. I leave all of that to you.

I mentioned this to [redacted] the other day.

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If there is anything I can do to help, please call.

*Regards,*



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**S**ince 1982, U.S. law enforcement officials have acquired considerable evidence implicating Cuba and other communist nations in international drug trafficking.

Former Cuban intelligence (DGI) agents have testified that the DGI runs drugs into the United States and uses its agents as drug pushers in the United States. As needed, the DGI is assisted in this business by other Cuban officials such as military officials and diplomats. DGI officials have directed their agents to "load up the United States with drugs."

Former Nicaraguan officials have described how Cuban Gen. Raúl Castro, minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces and second secretary of the Cuban politburo, encouraged and assisted Nicaragua to join the drug trafficking business. Former diplomats and intelligence officials who have fled Nicaragua to seek asylum in the United States have testified that the drug business is an official government operation run by Nicaraguan intelligence, which in turn is controlled by Cuban and Soviet advisers.

Drug dealers and operators-turned-informers have provided elaborate detail on Cuban and Nicaraguan production, transshipment and distribution, mainly directed against the United States and increasingly against Europe. Both Cuba and Nicaragua have been linked to numerous Latin American terrorist organizations, predominately pro-Soviet, providing them guns in exchange for drugs that are then delivered to the United States, all of which are controlled by the Soviet intelligence services, and organizing "safe havens" for drug traffickers en route to the United States.

Numerous sources have also tied Bulgarian intelligence and other East European intelligence services to drug trafficking against both U.S. and NATO forces and against all the NATO nations, beginning with the United States.

The objectives of these intertwined drug trafficking operations, as stated by many independent sources, especially former high-level officials, are to use drugs as a political weapon against the United States. Money is an important incentive, they explain, but the real motivation is political, and the main target is the U.S. youth.

The most recent statement is that of the former Nicaraguan minister-counselor, Antonio Farach. He explained how the Nicaraguan officials justified their drug business. "In the first place, drugs did not remain in Nicaragua. The drugs were destined for the United States, the youth of our enemy. Therefore, the drugs were used as a political weapon because in that way we were delivering a blow to our principal enemy."

Carlos Lehder Rivas, the Cuban-supported Colombian drug kingpin, in an interview in 1985 on Colombian television announced, "He who plants coca denounces imperialism," and "Cocaine is the Latin American atomic bomb."

### The Politics of Drugs

Unfortunately, the political side of drug trafficking—perhaps its most important dimension—somehow seems to get lost. Attention is focused on the domestic side of the problem. Few people ask how the problem arose and why it has become so severe in the past three decades. Most people simply assume the lure of high profits

*Joseph D. Douglass Jr. is a defense analyst with Falcon Associates, McLean, Va.*

*Gen. Maj. Jan Sejna was secretary of the Czechoslovak Defense Council and chief of cabinet at the Ministry of Defense prior to his leaving and seeking political asylum in 1968. They also co-authored Decision-Making in Communist Countries: An Inside View.*

# INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING:

## THE SOVIET CONNECTION

BY JOSEPH D. DOUGLASS JR.  
AND JAN SEJNA



has caused the rise in narcotics trafficking.

Even the State Department stresses the apolitical, profit-motivated nature of international drug trafficking. At congressional hearings on international terrorism and drug trafficking in May 1985, Clyde D. Taylor, deputy assistant secretary of state, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, emphasized in his opening statement, "Another fact which we would like to establish . . . is that narcotics trafficking in Latin America, in Asia, in the Middle East and in

Europe, is dominated by narcotics traffickers who are governed only by their greed and whose only ideology—if you can call it one—is the pursuit of profit . . . nor do we have evidence of a Communist conspiracy to use drugs to undermine Western democracies or our own society in particular.”

However, just based on the types of evidence summarized above, there are good reasons to question the State Department's position. Accepting the notion that politics are not a significant factor and that there is no communist conspiracy may be a serious over-

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**“It is important to recognize that the Soviet Union has had a hand in the growth of international narcotics trafficking.”**

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sight in light of the magnitude of the drug-associated problems, both in the United States and abroad, and the desire of President Ronald Reagan and the public to wage an effective war on drugs. The motivations, organizations and strategy behind the drug business are critically important. These should be critical targets in the battle. If there is an important dimension—a political plan or conspiracy—that is not recognized, then the United States and its allies may be fighting a losing battle.

It is important to recognize that the Soviet Union has had a hand in the growth of international narcotics trafficking. There is considerable data, which has gone unreported, that sets forth the origins of Soviet interests, formation of their strategy and management of satellite intelligence services for employing drugs as a political weapon against the West.

Since there is no indication that the Soviet operation has ceased in recent years and numerous telltale indications that it remains a major force, the data deserves serious attention. Whether the Soviet operation is 60 percent of the cause behind the current problem or 90 percent cannot be determined. More research is required to make that judgment. What can be said, however, is that it would be most unwise to ignore or to treat lightly the potential importance of the Soviet narcotics strategy and of the coordinated efforts of all the communist satellites and surrogates.

### **Taking a Cue from the Chinese**

The drug problem has its origins in the late 1940s, when the Chinese communists seized control of mainland China and incorporated narcotics trafficking into their strategy to destroy the bourgeois of the world. Their initial targets were the United States and Japan. When the Korean War began, China, acting with the North Koreans, used narcotics, mainly opium and heroin, to undermine the effectiveness of U.S. military forces. These Chinese operations were identified in detail by undercover U.S. Treasury agents, U.S. Army intelligence and subsequently confirmed by Chinese defectors.

During the Korean War, the Soviets, together with the North Koreans and Czechs, studied the tactics and equipment of the U.S. forces. In the process, they became particularly interested in the effect of the Chinese and North Korean drugs on U.S. combat effectiveness. Through autopsies conducted on dead U.S. soldiers, the communists learned that a large number of young U.S. soldiers—up to 22 percent—had suffered heart damage or, as the Soviets called them, “mini-heart attacks.” These statistics astounded the communist doctors. The heart damage was not the results of battle or the

cause of death. The damage had occurred earlier, and considering the age of the soldiers, 18 to 21 years old, the only possible cause the doctors could identify was the use of hard narcotics, which Soviet intelligence had estimated to be widespread among the U.S. servicemen.

This finding so excited the Soviets that after the war they initiated a detailed study of the use of drugs and narcotics as a strategic weapon that could be used to cripple capitalist societies. This was a joint military-civilian study that involved the Soviet, Czechs and North Koreans. Key participants were military intelligence, civilian intelligence, the Ministry of Health and the Academy of Sciences.

The study team examined the long-term impact of drugs on health, education, economy, labor productivity, intelligence services, security and defense over several generations. The study concluded that the effects would be enormous and that the most vulnerable countries were the United States, Canada, France and West Germany. The Soviet Defense Council approved the study and officially entered the drug business in early 1956.

The Soviets spent the next four years developing production techniques, marketing strategy and tactics and training intelligence cadres for the operation. Former premier Nikita Khrushchev viewed this business as a strategic operation that needed to be carefully prepared, especially so that it could be conducted covertly, without raising the suspicions of the targeted countries, most specifically the United States.

The Soviets went operational against the United States shortly after the Cuban revolution. The opportunity came when Raúl Castro, then deputy prime minister of Cuba, visited Czechoslovakia in the early fall of 1960 in search of military aid and assistance. At the time, the Soviets regarded Fidel Castro as an anarchist rather than a communist and did not trust him. Fidel Castro resented the Soviet lack of trust, and in return, he distrusted the Soviets. This is why the Cubans went to Czechoslovakia seeking aid rather than to the Soviet Union. The Czechs arranged to have Khrushchev invite Raúl Castro to Moscow for discussions, and upon his return to Prague, Khrushchev directed Czechoslovakia to work with the Cubans and pave the way for an eventual Soviet takeover of Cuba.

Czechoslovakia agreed to help the Cubans obtain military equipment, train the Cubans in military operations and set up Cuban intelligence and counterintelligence. In return, Cuba agreed to become a revolutionary center in the West and to allow Czechoslovakia to establish an intelligence station in Cuba. Roughly 50 percent of the Czech advisers and intelligence agents that went to Cuba were actually Soviets operating under Czech cover. Within three years, all Czechs in key positions were replaced by Soviets.

After the first Cubans were trained as intelligence agents, they received their first directions from Moscow: to infiltrate the United States and all Latin American countries and begin the production and distribution of drugs and narcotics into the United States. The Czech advisers helped the Cubans initiate production and set up transportation routes through Canada and Mexico, where the Czechs had good agent networks, into the United States. It is worth noting that in congressional hearings in 1984, U.S. officials identified 1962 as the year when the United States became aware that Cuba was running drugs into the United States.

In late 1961 or early 1962, the Czech Defense Council received instructions from the Soviet Defense Council to direct Cuban intelligence to expand its operation by infiltrating all the Latin American drug production and distribution networks. As part of this

operation, the Cubans were to collect information on the corruption that accompanies the drug trade. Obtaining such information was also one of the main reasons for infiltrating the drug networks. The information would be used to covertly coordinate drug operations and enable the Soviets ultimately to exercise strategic control over presumably independent drug operations. Additionally, the infor-

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**"Khrushchev said, '... anything that speeds the destruction of capitalism is moral.'"**

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mation would be used to blackmail and recruit a near-inexhaustible supply of both willing and unwitting Soviet agents of influence throughout the Americas for strategic operations. The implications of this often-overlooked dimension of the drug trafficking business, in the long run, may be even more serious than the societal and economic disruptions caused by drug pushing itself.

The operation to infiltrate and collect data on corruption was organized in Cuba in 1962 during the Second Havana Conference. During the conference, Cuban and Czech intelligence held a secret meeting of Soviet and Soviet-trained intelligence agents who were members of the various Latin American organizations attending the conference. The meeting served to coordinate plans for sabotage and other strategic intelligence operations throughout the Western Hemisphere, including the infiltration of existing drug and narcotics production and distribution networks and the collection of incriminating information on corruption.

Later, in the fall of that year, Khrushchev called the top Warsaw Pact leaders to a secret meeting in Moscow. Attending the meeting were the first secretaries, premier ministers, ministers of defense and their key staff, roughly 15 officials from each country. Jan Sejna attended as part of the Czech delegation. The meeting was called to discuss negative economic tendencies and corrective measures. Midway through the meeting, Khrushchev turned to the subject of drugs. Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese were smart, he said, and he praised their imagination and operativeness. But, he continued, the Warsaw Pact intelligence services were more well developed and better organized and should step in and exploit the drug opportunities as fast as possible.

Khrushchev carefully explained how the business would cripple the democratic societies while simultaneously generating much-needed foreign exchange for intelligence operations. It would undermine the health and morale of U.S. soldiers and weaken the human factor in the defense situation, he said. Further, it would cripple the educational system. U.S. schools were high-priority targets because this is where the future leaders of the bourgeois were to be found. Another high-priority target Khrushchev identified was the U.S. work ethic, pride and loyalty. Finally, drugs and narcotics would lessen the influence of religions and, he added, under certain conditions, could be used to create chaos.

Sejna's recollection of Khrushchev's remarks remains clear, especially his closing words. "When we discuss this strategy," Khrushchev said, "there were some who were concerned that this operation might be immoral. But we must state categorically," he then emphasized, "that anything that speeds the destruction of capitalism is moral."

Later in the day at an informal gathering of the Pact officials, Khrushchev talked further about the importance of the drug business with the Czech delegation. This was when Sejna learned the

code name of the operation. Khrushchev grinned, nudged Sejna in the ribs and told him the name of the operation was *Druzba Narobov*, that is, "National Friendship." The name was pure Khrushchev—clever deception but with a clear and obvious meaning: the drug were friends that would help destroy the enemy.

Following this meeting, the satellite leaders returned home and began to organize the narcotics trafficking. Initially, the most active countries, besides the Soviet Union, were Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary. Within roughly two years, East Germany and Poland were also strong participants.

### Tightest Security

In the case of Czechoslovakia, the operations plan was immediately developed under the tightest security. Nineteen individuals who were to put the plan together were sequestered in an MOD villa for a week. They came from the Administrative Organs Department, International (Foreign) Department, Military Health Administration, GRU (strategic intelligence) and Ministry of Interior (Second Administration). When completed, the plan was presented to the Defense Council by the minister of interior, Rudol Barak. At that meeting, in response to a question on finances from the first secretary, he estimated that the operation would bring in enough revenues to pay for the entire Czech military intelligence operation. Actually, in 1964, the operation paid for 50 percent of the GRU foreign operations expenses (not including salaries of operations financed by the Soviets). This grew to 70 percent (or about \$22 million) in 1966, and at that time, the GRU profit (after all expenses were paid) from just the Cuban portion of the operation totaled about \$8 million. Further, in 1966, the GRU estimated that by 1968 the total income from narcotics trafficking would cover all foreign GRU expenses.

Throughout the satellites and the Soviet Union, the drug business was accorded the highest secrecy classification, that of "state importance," which is above the level of top secret. Documentation was extremely guarded. In Czechoslovakia, there were only three copies of the Defense Council's decision and approved plan. These copies were held in the Second Administration of the Ministry of Interior (the civilian secret police), the GRU and the Defense Council Secretariat. All instructions to the heads of participating agencies were oral, and most people working on the various facets of the operation were given deceptive explanations for what they were doing so that even they were unaware of the basic plan. Aside from the Defense Council itself, very few people, even among the top leadership, were aware of operation *Druzba Narobov*.

Almost as soon as the satellite operations had begun, Khrushchev decided that the implementation was not proceeding fast enough. Khrushchev even admitted that he was partially to blame in being too cautious. Accordingly, in 1963 he instructed Gen. Maj. Nikolai Savinkin, the deputy head of the Administrative Organs Department (he became head of the department in 1964 and is still in that position today), to visit all the satellite countries and Cuba and prepare a coordinated plan to speed up the narcotics operation. Savinkin's plan was approved by the Soviet Defense Council, and instructions were sent to all the satellites and Cuba.

The instructions from the Soviet Defense Council following the approval of Savinkin's plan dealt with a wide variety of matters, including 1) which banks in different countries were to be used to handle the income, 2) the cooperation to be provided by the European intelligence services in assisting in the infiltration of Latin American drug networks and in the collection of corruption data, 3)

the instruction on propaganda and disinformation, 4) the directions for research, development and testing of more effective drugs, which was to be conducted within the military medical services for security reasons, 5) the directions on which satellite countries' operations were to be coordinated and in what countries, 6) the names of people in different countries who would help with the distribution, 7) instructions organizing transportation and logistics support for the trafficking and 8) points of contact for getting advice on additional vulnerabilities (markets) and techniques from experts who were continuing to study the impact of drugs in the different countries.

The instructions on propaganda were of such importance that a special office was established in the Administrative Organs Department to oversee the activities, which were planned in Moscow and implemented mainly by the departments of propaganda of the Central Committee and the GRU departments of special propaganda. The propaganda was intended to make society blame itself for the West's narcotics problem. Moreover, organizations and individuals considered inimical to Soviet policy were to be discredited (for example, by revealing their internal drug-related corruption). Finally, following special instructions received from First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in 1964, the satellites were to publicize the Chinese narcotics operation and, by so doing, distract the world's attention away from the Soviet operation.

During the Vietnam War, the Soviets and Czechs negotiated an agreement with the North Vietnamese to produce narcotics in North Vietnam. This was part of a practice begun in roughly 1963 to produce the drugs locally, in the vicinity of the target audience, rather than ship them in from Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union. In the case of the Vietnam War, the products were shipped through Thailand and via the Viet Cong to the U.S. forces in the south. By 1967, the Soviet intelligence services estimated that the use of drugs against the U.S. soldiers had become even more effective than it had been in the Korean War. At that time, the KGB estimated that 90 percent of the U.S. servicemen were using drugs of one variety or another. Seeking to capitalize on this situation and on the antiwar movement of the youth in the United States, which itself was also fueled by Soviet propaganda and deception operations, in the spring of 1967, Savinkin stressed to a visiting delegation of high-level Czech officials the need to increase the drug trade, specifically against U.S. and NATO forces to "corrupt the officers, recruit intelligence agents and impair the functioning of soldiers."

In January 1967, the Soviets finished a study that concluded that the drugs would be an effective weapon to use against a new rising class in the United States, the "technical elite." Drugs and narcotics were to be used to sabotage this important class and to facilitate the Soviet theft of high-tech equipment. At the end of 1967, during a special display of stolen technology, the chief of Czech military intelligence explained to visiting Soviet officials that, by his estimate, 20 to 25 percent of the technology stolen from the West during 1967 was facilitated by the use of drugs.

In a sense, 1967 was another watershed year in the Soviet operation, the first being 1960 and the second, 1962. In 1967, the Soviets directed the further intensification of the narcotics operations—in Cuba and throughout Latin America, in technology theft operations and against the U.S. and NATO military forces. And, in the fall, Moscow again summoned all the satellite intelligence chiefs to a meeting to receive instructions to speed the exploitation of the many opportunities that had become available.

By the end of 1967, Cuba had infiltrated 90 percent of all the

Latin American drug operations, and discussions with Raúl Castro had shifted from increasing infiltration to the need to destroy those drug operations that were still independent and "noncooperative." Finally, it was clear during the review of the Czechoslovak intelligence plan in December that Cuban intelligence planning had been fully coordinated with the Warsaw Pact "integrated

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**"Evidence relating to Soviet (and Chinese) actions has been ignored, . . . possibly even suppressed."**

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intelligence system," which itself had been set up in 1964 to give the Soviet intelligence services direct control and supervision of all the satellite intelligence services and operations.

### Folly to Close Our Eyes

Over the past 15 years, international narcotics trafficking has multiplied manyfold. It now has solid roots in all Latin American countries. It has corrupted countless Latin American officials, and one must assume many in the United States as well. It has led to the brutal torture and murder of U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency agents and to the ruthless killing of public officials who have attempted to resist the drug dealers, most notably the 24 ministers of justice in Colombia. It has become married to international terrorism, whose links to the Soviet Union the U.S. government also remains reluctant to confront. This, on top of the magnitude of the domestic problems is why fighting the drug business has become so important.

At the same time, it seems only reasonable not to mislead the public about the prospects for success in this war. That is, it may be quite difficult to combat the drug and narcotics problem effectively if the role of the Soviet Union—its strategy, plans, tactics and organization—is not taken into account. The combination of Western industrial and financial interests, coupled with an overwhelming desire to reach nuclear arms control agreements with the Soviets has generated considerable pressure for the United States to avoid actions or words that might be considered confrontational or anti-Soviet.

Evidence relating to Soviet (and Chinese) actions has been ignored, often not collected or actively pursued and, in certain cases possibly even suppressed. The problem is not a lack of evidence, as many bureaucrats would have congress and the public believe. Rather, the problem is a failure to assemble and analyze available evidence. The foregoing material is presented as an example of evidence that is available but not pursued. Moreover, this is only the tip of the iceberg.

The apparent disinclination to collect, assemble and analyze available evidence has resulted in a perception of the drug and narcotics problem that does not include what may be a critical dimension of the problem: the Soviet operation that coordinates its many resources in using drugs and narcotics as a political weapon to cripple Western societies. The drugs are political weapons. In the 1960s the communists implemented a plan to coordinate resources and use the weapon to its greatest effectiveness. The main target was the United States. There is no reason to our knowledge to believe this is no longer the case.

Until this possibility is recognized and seriously examined which is not happening now, the war on drugs is not being taken seriously by those responsible for carrying it out, and the prospect for success in the war are significantly diminished. ●